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Abstract 
This paper uses micro-level data from a nationally representative survey of 22,000 individuals in 
14 Eastern European countries to investigate the effects of institutional, social, and individual 
factors on taxpayers’ perceptions of power, motivations to comply, and non-compliant behaviors. 
The results indicate that taxpayer behavior is a multifaceted phenomenon: attitudes of peers, 
individual compliance norms, and the tax burden impact on non-compliance. Moreover, I find 
several effects of the subjective appraisal of the interaction with tax administrations. Positive 
experiences strengthen perceptions of power and intrinsic motivations to comply. They also 
increase the propensity to report non-compliant behavior in the past, suggesting educational 
effects of taxpayer services and tax audits. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates determinants of tax compliance behavior. I examine how institutional, 
social, and personal factors shape taxpayers’ perceptions of power, motivations to comply, and 
non-compliant behaviors. Behavioral research on tax compliance indicates that the standard 
economic theory of tax evasion (Alingham & Sandmo, 1972) does not sufficiently explain high 
compliance levels in the aggregate (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1992). Alm et al. argue that 
taxpayers comply because they value public goods and overestimate audit probabilities. 
Similarly, Guala and Mittone (2005) observe “bomb crater effects” in experimental studies, 
where participants reduce their compliance in response to tax audits, presumably because they 
underestimate the probability of future audits, or because they want to make up for past losses. 
Against this background, a growing body of literature explores the behavioral determinants of tax 
compliance. 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), for instance, differentiate taxpayers according to their 
motivations to comply. They assume that only a minority generally opposes paying taxes, while 
most taxpayers are willing to cooperate, so that different regulatory strategies should be applied 
to promote compliance (Braithwaite, 2003). Likewise, Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) argue 
that a combination of effective enforcement (power) and mutual trust between taxpayers and 
revenue bodies increases compliance. Audits are necessary to detect non-compliance and enforce 
cooperation from disengaged or reactant taxpayers, but a trusting relationship between authorities 
and taxpayers likely elevates voluntary cooperation and intrinsic motivations to comply. Taken 
together, the literature suggests that institutional, social, and individual factors affect taxpayers’ 
willingness to comply (for an overview see Kirchler, 2007). 
Research on institutional factors has predominantly analyzed the effects of enforcement 
activity on compliance behaviors. Various studies analyze the deterrent effect (Alm, Jackson, & 
McKee, 2009) of tax audits (e.g. DeBacker, Heim, Tran, & Yuskavage, 2015). Gemmell and 
Ratto (2012) provide initial indication of the ambiguous effects of audits on reporting compliance 
and Beer, Kasper, Kirchler, and Erard (2015) investigate behavioral responses to tax audits 
among self-employed taxpayers in the US. While audits show to have a deterrent effect on 
taxpayers who received additional tax assessments, sole proprietors who were not found to be 
non-compliant reduced their tax payments in subsequent years. Similarly, Mendoza, Wielhouver, 
and Kirchler (2015) observe that audits might weaken voluntary compliance when they are 
conducted excessively. Refining the literature on deterrence effects of audits, several authors 
explore the social and individual dimension of tax compliance. 
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Alm, McClelland, & Schulze (1999), for instance, provide experimental evidence of the 
effects of social norms and group communication on individual reporting decisions. They find 
that social norms impact on tax compliance behavior. Likewise, Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gaechter 
(2002) identify strong behavioral responses to perceptions of fair treatment. Their study 
participants showed a tendency to cooperate voluntarily and to punish non-cooperators, 
indicating that fairness considerations affect compliance behavior and reciprocity facilitates the 
enforcement of social norms. Wenzel (2005) investigates the dynamics between tax ethics, social 
norms, and motivations to comply. He finds that social norms shape tax compliance behavior 
only when taxpayers identify with the relevant social group, indicating a mediating effect of 
personal compliance norms. 
This is in line with findings on the effects of personal tax norms on compliance. Alm 
and Torgler (2006) observe a negative correlation between the degree of tax morale and the size 
of the shadow economy. Moreover, they find a strong relationship between tax morale and trust, 
supporting the assumptions of Kirchler et al. (2008). Feld and Frey (2002) analyze the effects of 
political participation on tax morale and find that the relationship between taxpayers and tax 
authorities shapes tax morale. Taxpayers trust the authorities, if they treat them fair and 
respectfully, which in turn has positive effects on compliance. Some scholars have moreover 
argued that taxpayer services educate taxpayers and thus facilitate compliance (e.g. Braithwaite, 
2003). But despite this broad body of evidence on the effects of institutional, social, and 
individual determinants of tax compliance, rather little is known about the relative effects of these 
factors on compliance behavior. 
This paper aims to add to the existing research by exploring the relative effects of a 
variety of determinants of tax compliance behavior that have been identified in the literature. 
Most studies focus on few selected factors when trying to explain tax compliance, yet taxpayer 
behavior is a multifaceted phenomenon (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998; Kirchler, 2007). I 
use micro-level data from a nationally representative survey of 22,000 individuals in 14 Eastern 
European countries to investigate the impact of institutional, social, and individual factors on 
taxpayers’ perceptions of power, motivations to comply, and non-compliant behaviors. 
Investigating large scale, representative survey data allows to assess a variety of behavioral 
dimensions that are not observable otherwise Specifically, it provides insights into perceptions of 
institutional factors such as the quality of public services, the effectiveness of legal systems, and 
tax system characteristics, social factors such as social norms and the prevalence of bribery, and 
individual factors such as personal norms and trust in institutions. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the data and empirical 
strategy. In Section 3, I present my empirical results. Section 4 discusses the main findings and 
concludes. 
2. Data and empirical strategy 
Data 
I use data from the “Public Goods through Private Eyes” (PGPE) survey1, an EU funded project 
that explores attitudes towards public goods and the state in 14 Eastern European countries2 
(Letki, 2015). The survey was developed by an international research group and covers nine 
dimensions: (1) local community, (2) social trust and social cohesion, (3) personality and 
commitment (4) public goods, (5) institutional quality, (6) tax behavior and compliance, (7) green 
behavior, (8) political participation, and (9) socio-economic background. Some survey items 
were adapted from previous studies. The tax behavior and compliance section, for instance, 
comprises several questions from the tax compliance inventory (Kirchler & Wahl, 2010). All 
items were translated according to the European Social Survey Round 5 (ESS Round 5) 
translation guidelines3 and tested with a representative sample in each country. 
The data was collected by fieldwork companies between November 2013 and August 
2014. All national samples are representative. The sample selection process (stratified clustered 
random samples) was standardized across all countries. First, primary sampling units (PSUs), 
were randomly selected on the basis of census information for regions and population sizes. 
Second, using a random route algorithm and taking into account expected response rates, 
households (secondary sampling units) were identified. Based on the Kish grid or the next (last) 
birthday principle, one respondent (aged 15+) was then randomly selected from each household 
and surveyed in a face-to-face setting.4 The final sample comprises approximately 1,500 subjects 
per country. The total number of respondents is 22,039 (58% female; age M=51.47, SD=17.86). 
The survey covers a variety of dimensions and includes a great number of items. I apply a 
two-step approach to identify those items that are relevant for the analysis. First, based on the 
literature on tax compliance behavior, I select questions that capture relevant institutional, social, 
and individual factors. Subsequently, I run main component analyses for each construct to 
identify underlying factors. I retain all survey items that load higher than 0.5 on the first factor 
                                                          
1 Project homepage: http://www.is.uw.edu.pl/pl/badania-i-konferencje/public-goods-through-private-eyes/ 
2 Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
3 Available at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round5/methods/ESS5_translation_guidelines.pdf 
4 Only one method was applied per country. Participants in Poland and Romania were aged 18+. 
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identified (Field, 2009). This results in 19 scales with 1 to 8 items each. Finally, I run reliability 
analyses. Scale reliabilities range from 0.62 to 0.96. Appendix A depicts survey items as well as 
the results of the main component and reliability analyses. Variable descriptions are provided in 
Appendix B. Correlations are displayed in Appendix C. 
Explanatory variables: institutional, social, and individual factors 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses. Ten scales capture 
institutional factors (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74 – 0.86). These include quality of public services 
(public_services), legal effectiveness (legal_system), enforcement capacity (capacity), tax system 
complexity (complexity), satisfaction with the tax system (satisfaction), tax system fairness 
(fairness), effectiveness of public spending (effectiveness), waste of public funds (waste), and the 
perceived tax burden (abs_burden and rel_burden). Three scales assess social factors 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.62 – 0.90). They capture national compliance levels (country), social 
norms (society), and the prevalence of corruption and bribery (corr_brib). Finally, five scales 
measure individual factors (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92 – 0.96): personal experience with bribery 
(brib_exp), individual norms (compliance), trust in institutions (trust), peer norms (peers)5, and 
self-employment (self_emp). Additionally, the quality of taxpayer services (tax_services) is 
assessed (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.96). Respondents were asked to evaluate the tax office on seven 
dimensions such as competence, helpfulness, and politeness. However, these questions were only 
asked if respondents stated that they had interacted with the tax office in the last year. 
  
                                                          
5 Clearly, peer norms have a social dimension. I consider them as an individual factor because they have been found 
to affect behavior much more strongly than social norms (e.g. Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 
2007). 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Dimension Factor Scale Mean (SD) Obs. 
Institutional Public_services 0 – 10 4.96 (1.83) 17,846 
 Legal_system 1 – 5 2.32 (0.85) 20,763 
 Capacity 1 – 5 2.85 (1.06) 21,234 
 Complexity 1 – 5 2.18 (1.07) 19.757 
 Satisfaction 1 – 5 2.85 (1.09) 19,963 
 Fairness 1 – 5 2.50 (1.09) 19.874 
 Effectiveness 1 – 5 3.72 (1.16) 20,236 
 Waste 1 – 5 2.09 (1.12) 20,414 
 Abs_ burden 1 – 6 3.03 (1.73) 17,436 
 Rel_burden 1 – 5 3.28 (0.95) 12,157 
Social Country 1 – 5 3.52 (0.97) 19,714 
 Society 0 – 10 5.25 (2.30) 17,242 
 Corr_brib 1 – 5 3.63 (0.88) 17,263 
Individual Brib_exp Dummy 15.58% 3,433 
 Compliance 1 – 5 1.76 (0.70) 19,675 
 Trust 0 – 10 4.27 (2.26) 18,435 
 Peers 0 – 10 3.86 (3.24) 15,768 
 Self_emp Dummy 7.19% 1,577 
 Tax_services 1 – 5 2.02 (0.92) 3,539 
Controls Female Dummy 58.36% 12,860 
 Age  51.47 (17.86) 22,039 
 Edu 1 – 8 3.52 (1.81) 21,943 
 Religion 1 – 8 3.57 (2.01) 21,463 
Dependent Perceived power 1 – 5 3.67 (0.84) 11,283 
 Intrinsic motivations to comply 1 – 5 3.90 (0.72) 13,922 
 Non-compliant behaviors 0 – 3 0.25 (1.68) 20,229 
Income types Wages & salaries   9,512 
 Self-employed income   909 
 Farming income   682 
 Pensions or disability benefits   8,223 
 Unemployment benefits   667 
 Other social benefits   1,034 
 Investment or savings income   256 
 Other income   1,056 
 No income   2,121 
N    22,039 
Notes: Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix B. Edu indicates the level of education on a scale from 1 
(early childhood education) to 8 (doctoral or equivalent), Religion captures church attendance (net of weddings or 
funerals) on a 8-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 8 (several times a week), Income types indicates sources of 
income (multiple answers possible). Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix B. 
  
7 
Dependent variables: perceptions of power, intrinsic motivations to comply, and non-
compliant behaviors 
I use respondents’ views on the frequency of audits to measure perceived power of tax 
authorities. The scale comprises three 5-point Likert scale items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73). Five 
items capture intrinsic motivations to comply (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). They assess subjects’ 
readiness to contribute to everyone’s good and the willingness to pay taxes because it is 
perceived as a civic duty. Non-compliant behaviors are assessed in three dichotomous items that 
are summed up to a 4-point scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.62). The items ask about different forms 
of non-compliant behavior in the past (under-declaration of income, over-deduction of expenses, 
and non-declaration of labor income). 
Empirical strategy 
I investigate how institutional, social, and individual factors affect perceptions of power, intrinsic 
motivations to comply, and compliance behaviors. Despite a substantial body of literature on the 
determinants of tax compliance, the drivers of compliance behavior are yet not entirely clear 
(Alm, 2012). Scholars have investigated the role of institutional factors such as enforcement 
capacity (Andreoni et al., 1998; Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010), social factors such as 
social norms (e.g. Alm et al. 1999, Wenzel, 2005), and individual factors such as individual’s 
intrinsic willingness to pay taxes (e.g. Alm & Torgler, 2006). But while all of these factors have 
been found to affect tax compliance, little is known about their relative importance in shaping 
taxpayer behavior. I explore large-scale survey data to investigate how these factors impact on 
taxpayers’ attitudes and compliance choices in the aggregate. Therefore, I refrain from between-
country comparisons in this analysis.6 
3. Results 
In the following sections I present results from OLS regressions. Five specifications are displayed 
for each dependent variable. The first three columns illustrate the effects of institutional, social, 
and individual factors respectively. Column four includes the effects of all explanatory variables 
except satisfaction with taxpayer services, because only a small share of taxpayers interacted with 
the tax office in the past year. Specification five incorporates all explanatory variables. All 
models control for gender, age, education, and religiousness.7 
                                                          
6 Means and standard deviations on country levels are provided in Appendix D. 
7 I do not account for income effects because income was not assessed on the individual level. 
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Perceived power 
Regression results for perceived power are presented in Table 2. In line with findings of Kasper, 
Kogler, and Kirchler (2015), I find that institutional factors have a significant impact on 
perceived power (column 1). Specifically, an increase in the quality of public services, 
enforcement capacity, satisfaction with the tax system, effectiveness of public spending, and the 
absolute tax burden go along with higher levels of perceived power. The coefficient of tax system 
satisfaction, however, is highly significant and negative. With regard to social factors, 
coefficients for country level compliance and prevalence of corruption and bribery are significant 
(specification 2). Respondents indicate higher perceived power if national compliance levels are 
high, but surprisingly also if corruption and bribery are widespread. Column 3 shows the effects 
of individual factors on perceptions of power. The coefficients of personal experience with 
bribery, attitudes towards compliance, trust, peer norms, and self-employment are significant and 
positive. This provides an additional perspective to the findings of Kogler et al. (2013) who 
observe positive effects of trust on perceived power. 
I obtain similar results when considering institutional, social, and individual factors 
simultaneously (column 4). Again, satisfaction shows to be the strongest institutional predictor, 
while the coefficients of public_services, capacity, fairness, effectiveness, and abs_burden are 
also highly significant. As to social factors, coefficients of country, and corr_brib are significant 
and positive, whereas the effect of society is significant and negative. On the individual level, 
compliance, peers, and self_emp explain perceptions of power, with individual compliance norms 
being the strongest predictor of perceived power among all variables. That is, as personal 
compliance norms increase by 0.70 scale points (one standard deviation), perceived power 
increases by 0.13 scale points. In specifications 1 to 4, the coefficients of age and education are 
positive and significant. They are not significant, however, in specification 5, where I 
additionally incorporate respondents’ evaluation of taxpayer services (tax_services) in the 
regression. Once again, institutional factors such as public_services, capacity, and abs_burden 
and individual factors such as compliance and peers have positive effects on perceptions of 
power, while the coefficients of social factors are not significant.8  
                                                          
8 Country is marginally significant (p=0.097). 
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Table 2 Regression results: Perceived power 
Dependent variable: Perceived power 
Expl. Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pubic_Services 0.04**        
(0.01) 
  0.06***       
(0.01) 
0.09*         
(0.02) 
Legal_system 0.03 
(0.01) 
  0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Capacity 0.07*** 
(0.01) 
  0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
Complexity 0.02 
(0.01) 
  0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
Satisfaction 0.12*** 
(0.01) 
  0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Fairness -0.05** 
(0.01) 
  -0.08*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
Effectiveness 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
  0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Waste 0.01 
(0.01) 
  -0.02 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
Abs_burden 0.06*** 
(0.01) 
  0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
Rel_burden 0.02 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Country  0.11*** 
(0.01) 
 0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
Society  0.02 
(0.01) 
 -0.03* 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Corr_brib  0.04** 
(0.01) 
 0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Brib_exp   0.03* 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
Compliance   0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.17*** 
(0.02) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
Trust   0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.02) 
Peers   0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.05** 
(0.01) 
0.08* 
(0.01) 
Self_emp   0.03** 
(0.03) 
0.03* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
Tax_services     
 
0.08* 
(0.03) 
Male -0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
 (0.05) 
Age 0.01 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
Edu 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Religion 0.07***      
(0.01) 
0.08***      
(0.01) 
0.08***      
(0.01) 
0.05***      
(0.01) 
0.03           
(0.01) 
Adj. r² 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.08 
Obs. 7,560 8,205 7,840 5,255 1,161 
Notes: Coefficients are standardized. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5%, 
1%, and 0.1% level. Inter-scale correlations are displayed in Appendix C.  
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The impact of tax_services on perceived power is positive and significant at the 5% level. This 
indicates that taxpayers who have positive experiences with the tax office perceive tax authorities 
as more powerful. 
The number of observations is relatively small in specification five, because only few 
taxpayers interacted with the tax administration during the last year. However, the model explains 
substantially more variance than, for instance, the first three specifications, suggesting that 
perceptions of power are not explained by institutional, social, or individual factors alone. 
Intrinsic motivations to comply 
Table 3 depicts OLS regression results for respondents’ intrinsic motivation to comply. Column 1 
indicates that institutional factors, such as public_services, capacity, satisfaction, and fairness 
have significant positive effects on respondents’ intrinsic motivations to comply, while the effects 
of abs_burden and rel_burden are negative and significant. This is in line with findings reported 
by Feld and Frey (2002). Surprisingly, the coefficients of complexity and waste are positive and 
significant as well, indicating that the more complex the tax system and the more public funds are 
wasted, the higher subjects’ intrinsic motivations to comply. Building on the results reported by 
Kirchler (2007) and Kogler et al. (2013), I find that social (specification 2) and individual factors 
(specification 3) shape taxpayers’ compliance motivations. Specifically, the coefficients of social 
norms (society), individual norms (compliance), and trust in institutions (trust) are highly 
significant and positive. Corruption and bribery (corr_brib), on the other hand, have negative and 
significant effects on intrinsic motivations to comply. 
These results do not change substantially when considering institutional, social, and individual 
factors simultaneously (column 4), where besides religion, edu, and age also male shows to have 
a positive and significant effect on intrinsic motivations to comply. Specification 5 additionally 
incorporates tax_services. Being positive and highly significant, the coefficient of tax_services 
partly explains taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to comply. That is, respondents who report 
positive experiences with the tax office exhibit higher intrinsic motivations to comply. In addition 
to the institutional, social, and individual factors that affect respondents’ intrinsic motivations to 
comply, the coefficient of religiousness (religion) is significant and positive.9  
                                                          
9 Male is marginally significant (p=0.068). 
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Table 3 Regression results: Intrinsic motivations to comply 
Dependent variable: Intrinsic motivations to comply 
Expl. Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pubic_Services 0.06***     
(0.01) 
  0.04**       
(0.01) 
0.08*         
(0.01) 
Legal_system -0.02 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Capacity 0.13*** 
(0.01) 
  0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.08** 
(0.02) 
Complexity 0.03** 
(0.01) 
  0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Satisfaction 0.11*** 
(0.01) 
  0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
Fairness 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
Effectiveness 0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Waste 0.04*** 
(0.01) 
  0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Abs_burden -0.11*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.09*** 
(0.01) 
-0.11*** 
(0.02) 
Rel_burden -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07** 
(0.02) 
Country  0.03* 
(0.01) 
 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Society  0.09*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Corr_brib  -0.10*** 
(0.01) 
 0.04* 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
Brib_exp   -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Compliance   0.38*** 
(0.01) 
0.40*** 
(0.02) 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
Trust   0.17*** 
(0.01) 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
0.08* 
(0.01) 
Peers   0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Self_emp   0.03*** 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Tax_services     0.14*** 
(0.02) 
Male 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Age 0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Edu 0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Religion 0.14***       
(0.01) 
0.13***      
(0.01) 
0.10***      
(0.01) 
0.08***      
(0.01) 
0.09***     
(0.01) 
Adj. r² 0.11 0.06 0.24 0.29 0.31 
Obs. 8,587 9,297 8,970 5,674 1,232 
Notes: Coefficients are standardized. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5%, 
1%, and 0.1% level. Inter-scale correlations are displayed in Appendix C.  
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In comparison to the results for perceptions of power (reported in Table 1), the models 
explain a significant share of the variation in intrinsic motivations to comply with specification 
five accounting for almost one third of variance in the data. However, driven by the strong effects 
of trust and personal attitudes towards compliance, r2 differs substantially between specification 
two and specification three. Individual factors explain four times more variance in intrinsic 
motivations to comply than social factors, indicating a potential common method bias 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). 
Non-compliant behaviors 
The main results are presented in Table 4. It depicts the effects of institutional, social, and 
individual factors on non-compliant behaviors. Column 1 indicates that institutional factors 
reduce non-compliant behaviors. Confirming the results of Beer et al. (2015), coefficients of 
capacity, fairness, and effectiveness are negative and highly significant, which suggest that 
institutional quality promotes compliance. The coefficient of rel_burden, however, is negative 
and significant, suggesting that respondents who perceive their tax burden as relatively low are 
more likely to report past non-compliance. With regard to the effects of social factors on non-
compliant behaviors, specification 2 reveals that country and society have negative effects on 
non-compliant behavior, indicating that high national compliance levels and strong social norms 
increase compliance. This is in line with the findings of Alm et al. (1999). The effect of 
Corr_brib on non-compliant behaviors, on the other hand, is positive and highly significant. 
Column 3 shows that all individual predictors have significant effects on non-compliant 
behaviors, supporting the results of Alm and Torlger (2006). Brib_exp and self_emp increase 
non-compliant behaviors, whereas the effects of compliance, trust, and peers are negative. 
The fourth specification illustrates the simultaneous effect of institutional, social, and 
individual factors on non-compliant behaviors. It shows that public_services, fairness, 
rel_burden, country, brib_exp, compliance, and peers have significant and negative effects on 
non-compliant behaviors, whereas the effects of legal_system, brib_exp, self_emp, and male are 
positive.  
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Table 4 Regression results: Non-compliant behaviors 
Dependent variable: Non-compliant behaviors 
Expl. Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pubic_Services -0.02         
(0.01) 
  -0.04**       
(0.01) 
-0.08*       
(0.01) 
Legal_system 0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.09** 
(0.01) 
Capacity -0.04** 
(0.01) 
  -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Complexity 0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Satisfaction -0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.02 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
Fairness -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.09** 
(0.01) 
Effectiveness -0.03** 
(0.01) 
  -0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Waste -0.01 
(0.01) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Abs_burden 0.03 
(0.01) 
  0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
Rel_burden -0.07*** 
(0.01) 
  -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.10*** 
(0.01) 
Country  -0.10*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
Society  -0.03** 
(0.01) 
 -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
Corr_brib  0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Brib_exp   0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.02) 
Compliance   -0.10*** 
(0.01) 
-0.10*** 
(0.01) 
-0.16*** 
(0.01) 
Trustb   -0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Peers   -0.25*** 
(0.01) 
-0.26*** 
(0.01) 
-0.28*** 
(0.01) 
Self_emp   0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
Tax_services     0.06* 
(0.01) 
Male 0.11*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.08** 
 (0.01) 
Age -0.12*** 
(0.01) 
-0.09*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.01) 
Edu 0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Religion -0.04***    
(0.01) 
-0.04**        
(0.01) 
-0.02           
(0.01) 
-0.02          
(0.01) 
0.03           
(0.01) 
Adj. r² 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.19 
Obs. 8,771 13,811 13,106 5,742 1,240 
Notes: Coefficients are standardized. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 5%, 
1%, and 0.1% level. Inter-scale correlations are displayed in Appendix C.  
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While these results indicate that high institutional quality and strong social and individual norms 
have positive effects on compliance behaviors, the positive coefficient of legal_system, as well as 
the negative coefficient of rel_burden are counter-intuitive and will be discussed in the following 
section. Incorporating tax_services in the analysis (specification 5) does not change the results. 
Peer norms show to be the strongest predictor of compliance behavior, where an increase by 3.24 
scale points decreases non-compliance by 0.47 scale points. Importantly, the effect of 
tax_services on non-compliant behaviors is positive and significant. This indicates that taxpayers’ 
who have positive experiences with tax authorities are more likely to report non-compliant 
behavior in the past. Furthermore, male respondents are more likely to report non-compliant 
behaviors.10 
Again, specification three explains significantly more variance in the dependent variable 
than specifications one and two, indicating that individual factors such as personal attitudes 
towards compliance and peer norms are particularly relevant for compliance behavior. This is in 
line with the results from specifications four and five where personal attitudes and peer norms 
show to be the strongest predictors of non-compliant behaviors. 
4. Discussion 
This paper analyzes institutional, social, and individual factors to explain perceptions of tax 
authorities’ power, taxpayers’ motivations to comply, and non-compliant behaviors. Micro-level 
data from a nationally representative survey of 22,000 individuals in 14 Eastern European 
countries provides evidence that all three dimensions have significant effects on perceived power, 
intrinsic motivations to comply, and tax compliance behavior. These results add to a growing 
body of literature on the behavioral determinants of tax compliance, indicating that tax system 
characteristics, social norms, and individual attitudes shape taxpayer behavior. This has several 
implications for the design of tax policies. 
First, sound administrative structures are critical. While I do not find a significant direct 
effect of enforcement capacity on non-compliant behavior, efficient enforcement regimes might 
elevate fairness perceptions and reduce the prevalence of bribery. In line with prior studies (Feld 
& Frey, 2002), these factors show to affect non-compliant behaviors. Surprisingly, I find a 
positive effect of the effectiveness of legal systems and a negative effect of the relative tax 
burden on non-compliance. One potential explanation for this counterintuitive result is an 
unobserved factor that affects explanatory and dependent variables. Subjects with high income, 
                                                          
10 The coefficient of self_emp is marginally significant (p=0.052). 
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for instance, have a higher propensity to exhibit non-compliant behaviors. At the same time, they 
are more likely to use legal services to reduce their tax burden. But as the survey captures income 
only on the family level, I do not control for income effects.  
Second, compliance behavior has a social dimension. I find that attitudes of peers are the 
strongest predictor of compliance behaviors. That is, the less respondents think that people they 
know well find non-compliant behavior acceptable, the less likely they report past non-
compliance. This provides an additional perspective to the empirical observation that non-
compliance is more common in some professions and less so in others.  
Third, individual experiences and personal norms shape compliance behavior. The 
estimates indicate that personal experience with bribery increases non-compliance, whereas 
individual compliance norms show to have the opposite effect.  
Fourth, my findings refine recent empirical evidence on the differential effects of tax 
audits on sole proprietors’ reporting compliance (Beer et al., 2015). The authors observe that tax 
audits have negative effects on subsequent reporting compliance, if they do not result in 
additional tax assessments. While Beer et al. are unable to pinpoint the motivational origins of 
these behaviors, my results indicate that positive interactions with tax authorities have positive 
effects, as they increase perceived power and intrinsic motivations to comply. Providing taxpayer 
services thus likely builds trust between taxpayers and the authorities. At the same time, pleasant 
experiences with revenue bodies elevate respondents’ propensity to report non-compliant 
behavior in the past. This indicates that taxpayer services have educational effects. Adding to 
experimental evidence from Guala & Mittone (2005), taxpayer services and tax audits should 
therefore target companies during their first years in business. 
Finally, I address some limitations and potential extensions of the above analysis. I 
investigate the relative effects of several determinants of tax compliance behavior that have been 
identified in the literature. However, when exploring cross-sectional data, the causality between 
explanatory and dependent variables might not be entirely clear. Moreover, survey studies on tax 
compliance behavior are sometimes criticized for their lack of external validity, as respondents 
tend to understate undesired behaviors, for instance. My estimates of non-compliance might thus 
be biased. This study, however, does not aim to estimate levels of non-compliance but to explore 
the relative effects its determinants. Because obtaining objective measures of these determinants 
is not possible in many cases, using representative survey data from several countries is 
instructive to obtain statistically powerful estimates of the drivers of tax compliance. On the other 
hand, I am evidently unable to verify self-reported compliance behavior, and to rule out a 
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potential common method bias, without external data sources. Incorporating exogenous 
information on tax compliance behavior such as tax gap estimates would thus strengthen the 
credibility of the results. Likewise, additional analyses of country effects could provide 
interesting insights. The countries in my sample are former members of the Soviet Union. Their 
shared history, as well as the ongoing transition in the region might impact on taxpayers’ norms 
and attitudes towards taxation. Today, however, these countries differ substantially on several 
social and economic dimensions, so that I am confident about the representativeness of my 
findings.  
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Appendix 
A Survey Items 
Institutional factors 
Public_services  
Item Factor loadings 
How do you evaluate the public education system (e.g. preschools, schools, universities)? 0.76 
… the public healthcare system (e.g. doctor's practices, hospitals, rehabilitation centers)? 0.79 
… social benefits (e.g., unemployment benefits, disability benefits, pensions)? 0.78 
… the police? 0.82 
… your countries' judiciary? 0.76 
… the army and defense system? 0.77 
… the public infrastructure? 0.76 
… the environment protection? 0.78 
Eigenvalue 4.83 
% of variance 53.69 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.86 
Notes: 10-point scale ranging from 0 (very low) to 10 (very high). 
Legal_system 
Item Factor loadings 
The law in your country benefits influential people but not ordinary citizens. 0.59 
One can be sure that in your country people who break the law will get punished.* 0.73 
Citizens' rights in our country are well protected by law.* 0.82 
In this country law is applied to everyone equally.* 0.84 
Eigenvalue 2.28 
% of variance 45.53 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.74 
Notes: 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). *recoded item. 
Single item scales 
Item Factor 
Authorities in your country, such as police, courts, or tax offices work to make people 
comply with the law. 
Capacity 
Your countries' tax system is overly complex. Complexity 
The tax system in your country may not be perfect, but it works well for most people. Satisfaction 
Your countries' tax system is unfair. Fairness 
The government spends taxpayers' money effectively. Effectiveness 
The government is wasting a lot of public money. Waste 
The amount of taxes you are required to pay is… Abs_burden 
How do you feel, in comparison with other people, are you required to pay… Rel_burden 
Notes: Capacity is a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). Fairness is a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).Complexity, Satisfaction, Effectiveness, and Waste are 5-
point scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Abs_burden is a 6-point scale ranging from 1 
(no taxable income) to 6 (very high). Rel_burden is a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (much lower) to 5 (much higher).   
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Social factors 
Country 
Item Factor loadings 
Most people in this country always declare all their income to the tax office? 0.86 
Most people in this country who work for cash in hand payments pay taxes on this income? 0.82 
Eigenvalue 1.46 
% of variance 48.53 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.62 
Notes: 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). 
Society 
Item Factor loadings 
How common are the following types of behavior? Paying for goods or services without a 
bill or invoice in order to avoid VAT. 
0.76 
… claiming a welfare benefit one is not entitled to. 0.82 
… avoiding fare on public transport. 0.72 
… using personal connections to get a job for a member of one's family. 0.71 
… giving a bribe to a public official. 0.78 
Eigenvalue 3.25 
% of variance 46.48 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.84 
Notes: 10-point scale ranging from 0 (extremely common) to 10 (nonexistent). 
Corr_brib 
Item Factor loadings 
Most senior public officials take bribes in return for government contracts. 0.84 
Most members of parliament accept bribes in return for passing laws favoring some 
companies or interest groups. 
0.84 
Most judges and policemen take bribes in return for help with getting around the law. 0.85 
Most policemen, doctors, and teachers take bribes in return for preferential treatment. 0.80 
In the current situation giving bribes cannot be avoided. 0.69 
Without a bribe, you will not get what you need. 0.77 
To get what you need, you have to know the right people. 0.66 
Eigenvalue 4.63 
% of variance 51.42 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.90 
Notes: 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
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Individual factors 
Compliance 
Item Factor loadings 
One should always declare all income to the tax office. 0.44 
How acceptable or unacceptable do you find the following types of behavior: Paying for 
goods or services without a bill or invoice in order to avoid VAT. 
0.73 
… claiming a welfare benefit one is not entitled to. 0.80 
… avoiding the fare on public transport. 0.80 
… giving a bribe to a public official. 0.75 
Eigenvalue 2.84 
% of variance 31.59 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.76 
Notes: Item 1 of this scale is measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely not) to 5 (definitely yes). Items 
2-5 are measured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (completely acceptable) to 10 (completely unacceptable) and 
transformed to a 5-point scale in order to calculate the compliance scale. 
Trust 
Item Factor loadings 
How much trust do you have in the parliament? 0.78 
How much trust do you have in the government? 0.78 
How much trust do you have in the local government? 0.79 
How much trust do you have in the tax office? 0.84 
How much trust do you have in the social security agency? 0.83 
How much trust do you have in the police? 0.82 
How much trust do you have in courts and the legal system? 0.82 
Eigenvalue 5.64 
% of variance 62.61 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.92 
Notes: 10-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (A great deal of trust). 
Peers 
Item Factor loadings 
Think about three adults you know best, like your close friends or family members. What 
would they think if they learnt that you did not declare all of your income to the tax office? 
0.96 
… you claimed more tax deductions than you were entitled to? 0.93 
… you worked for cash in hand payments and did not pay tax on this income? 0.95 
Eigenvalue 2.71 
% of variance 89.22 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.94 
Notes: 10-point scale ranging from 0 (They’d think there is nothing wrong with it) to 10 (They’d find it completely 
unacceptable).  
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Tax_services 
Item Factor loadings 
People working at the Tax Office treated me politely and with respect. 0.86 
They tried hard to do what was best for me. 0.90 
They acted as I expected. 0.85 
Overall I was treated fairly. 0.90 
They were competent and efficient. 0.89 
They took into account my needs and the situation I was in. 0.90 
I am happy with the result of my contacts with the tax office. 0.92 
Eigenvalue 5.51 
% of variance 78.76 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.96 
Notes: 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Single item scales 
Item Factor 
Within the last couple of years was there a situation when you or a member of your family 
had to give a bribe? 
Brib_exp 
Did you earn self-employed or farming income within the last 12 months? Self_emp 
Notes: Brib_exp is a dummy that takes the value of one if subjects have personal experience with bribery. Self_emp 
is a dummy that takes the value of one if subjects report self-employed or farming income. 
Dependent Variables 
Perceived power 
Item Factor loadings 
In my opinion the tax office carries out many audits. 0.79 
I know I will be audited by the tax office. 0.73 
Tax returns are checked by the tax office very often. 0.83 
Eigenvalue 2.21 
% of variance 42.28 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.73 
Notes: Recoded 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
Intrinsic motivations to comply 
Item Factor loadings 
Paying taxes for me is an obvious thing to do. 0.77 
I like contributing to everyone's good. 0.72 
I consider paying taxes to be my civic duty. 0.84 
I am happy that by paying taxes I support the state and other citizens. 0.69 
Paying taxes for me is a natural thing to do. 0.82 
Eigenvalue 2.97 
% of variance 59.35 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.82 
Notes: Recoded 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
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Non-compliant behaviors 
Item Factor loadings 
Has it ever happened that you did not declare all of your income to the tax office? 0.86 
… you claimed larger tax deductions than you were entitled to?* 0.56 
… you worked for a cash in hand payment and did not pay taxes on this income? 0.82 
Eigenvalue 1.73 
% of variance 57.52 
Cronbach’s alpha 0.62 
Notes: 4-point scale ranging from 0 (subjects state they never under-reported income, over-deducted expenses, or did 
not declare labor income in the past) to 3 (subjects state they under-reported income, over-deducted expenses, and 
did not declare labor income in the past). 
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B. Scales and Survey Items Variable Description 
Dimension  Factor Description 
Institutional  Public_services Satisfaction with public services (e.g. education, healthcare) 
  Legal_system Captures the effectiveness of the legal system 
  Capacity Measures authorities’ capacity to make people comply with the 
law 
  Complexity Indicates tax system complexity 
  Satisfaction Captures how well the tax system works for most people 
  Fairness Perceived fairness of the tax system 
  Effectiveness Captures effectiveness of public spending 
  Waste Perceived extent of wasting of public funds 
  Abs_burden Captures perception that tax burden is too high 
  Rel_burden Perception that tax burden is too high relative to other people 
Social  Country Captures tax compliance behavior on the national level 
  Society Social norm of tax compliance 
  Corr_brib Captures prevalence of corruption and bribery 
Individual  Brib_exp Dummy that takes the value of one if subjects have personal 
experience with bribery 
  Compliance Captures attitudes towards compliance behaviors 
  Trust Captures trust in institutions (e.g. parliament, government, tax 
administration) 
  Peers Compliance norm within peer group 
  Self_emp Dummy that takes the value of one if subjects report self-
employed or farming income 
  Tax_services Satisfaction with tax payer services (interaction with tax 
administration in the last year) 
Controls  Male Dummy that takes the value of one if subjects are male 
  Age Age in years 
  Edu Indicates the level of education 
  Religion Captures church attendance (net of weddings or funerals) 
Dependent  Perceived power Measures perceived power of tax authorities 
  Intrinsic 
motivations to 
comply 
Captures taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to comply 
  Non-compliant 
behaviors 
Indicates non-compliant behaviors in the past                                                                  
(under-reporting, over-deducting, or non-declaration of labor 
income)  
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C. Correlations 
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (1%) level (2-tailed)  
 Pub Leg Cap Com Sat Fair Eff Was Abs Rel Cou Soc Cor Bri Com Tru Pee Sel Tax Mal Age Edu Rel Per Int Non 
Public_services 1                          
Legal_system .27** 1                         
Capacity .20** .37** 1                        
Complexity -.12** -.20** -.13** 1                       
Satisfaction .19** .27** .21** -.14** 1                      
Fairness .19** .30** .20** -.39** .28** 1                     
Effectiveness .17** .36** .19** -.12** .28** .21** 1                    
Waste -.13** -.30** -.17** .26** -.16** -.35** -.29** 1                   
Abs_burden -.13** -.07** -.02* .06** -.05** -.09** -.03** .04** 1                  
Rel_burden -.02 -.09** -.05** .05** -.10** -.12** -.12** .08** .21** 1                 
Country .11** .27** .19** -.10** .19** .15** .23** -.15** -.02* -.05** 1                
Society .05** .19** .14** -.07** .09** .10** .16** -.12** -.03** -.12** .22** 1               
Corr_brib -.32** -.38** -.22** .26** -.12** -.31** -.20** .29** .10** .05** -.12** -.25** 1              
Brib_exp -.10** -.10** -.07** .07** -.07** -.09** -.08** .07** .08** .00 -.06** -.08** .27** 1             
Compliance .02* -.02** .07** .00 .07** .07** -.02** .00 -.04** .01 .01 .24** .-11** -.11** 1            
Trust .54** .42** .34** -.20** .23** .28** .23** -.23** -.14** -.05** .12** .13** -.46** -.12** .10** 1           
Peers .05** .14** .12** -.08** .08** .13** .09** -.10** -.07** .00 .18** .24** -.14** -.10** .48** .13** 1          
Self_emp -.01 -.01 .00 .01 -.01 .00 -.02** .01 .12** .01 -.03** .00 .00 -.06** -.02** .00 -.06** 1         
Tax_services .26** .17** .19** -.12** .23** .16** .11** -.06** -.06** -.05** .08** .11** -.18** -.15** .18** .35** .16** -.04* 1        
Male -.02** -.02** -.02* .01 -.04** -.02** -.03** .02* .06** .01 -.02** -.02** .04** .02** -.06** -.03** -.07** .09** -.06** 1       
Age .04** -.01 .00 .03** .03** .00 .00 -.02* -.33** .01 .02** .08** -.05** -.09** .18** .08** .17** -.07** .06** -.07** 1      
Edu -.02** -.05** -.02* -.10** .00 .07** -.05** -.03** .15** -.01 -.03** -.01 -.09** .07** .01 .02** -.05** .05** .03 -.02** -.15** 1     
Religion -.05** .00 .04** .07** .03** .01 .04** .02** .01 -.08** .03** .02* .05** .04** .11** -.03** .08** .01 .02 -.17** .10** -.01 1    
Perceived_power .06** .08** .12** .02* .14** .01 .08** -.01 .05** .01 .11** .05** .02 .00 .17** .06** .15** .03** .13** -.03** .02* .03** .10** 1   
Intrinsic_motivations .12** .09** .16** -.03** .17** .12** .08** -.04** -.14** -.11** .06** .12** -.12** -.07** .42** .21** .27** .01 .25** -.03** .13** .07** .15** .38** 1  
Non_compliant_behavior -.06** -.05** -.04** .03** -.05** -.07** -.04** .03** .06** -.05** -.10** -.07** .06** .13** -.23** -.07** -.32** .10** -.08** .12** -.11** .07** -.07** -.07** -.12** 1 
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D. Means and standard deviations (country level) 
 
BGR HRV CZE EST HUN LVA LTU MDA POL ROU SRB SVK SVN UKR 
Public_Services 4.20 (1.70) 
5.41 
(1.66) 
6.10 
(1.61) 
5.82 
(1.33) 
5.02 
(1.70) 
5.67 
(1.65) 
5.72 
(1.7) 
3.44 
(2.2) 
4.74 
(1.42) 
5.08 
(1.7) 
4.69 
(1.78) 
4.87 
(1.65) 
5.02 
(1.49) 
3.78 
(1.52) 
Legal_system 1.87 (0.76) 
2.35 
(0.75) 
2.53 
(0.86) 
2.71 
(0.84) 
2.72 
(0.84) 
2.41 
(0.92) 
2.32 
(0.72) 
2.32 
(0.87) 
2.19 
(0.77) 
2.42 
(0.85) 
2.30 
(0.84) 
2.46 
(0.87) 
1.91 
(0.66) 
2.01 
(0.70) 
Capacity 3.12 (1.10) 
3.18 
(1.05) 
3.33 
(1.02) 
3.21 
(0.92) 
3.25 
(0.96) 
3.20 
(1.06) 
3.06 
(1.00) 
3.27 
(1.11) 
2.89 
(1.05) 
3.53 
(1.01) 
3.24 
(1.12) 
3.15 
(1.02) 
2.67 
(1.01) 
2.93 
(1.03) 
Complexity 3.56 (1.21) 
3.93 
(0.97) 
3.60 
(1.15) 
3.06 
(1.20) 
3.72 
(1.12) 
3.89 
(1.06) 
3.89 
(0.94) 
3.88 
(1.03) 
4.11 
(0.99) 
4.12 
(0.98) 
4.06 
(0.99) 
3.82 
(0.98) 
4.12 
(0.80) 
3.72 
(0.99) 
satisfaction 3.34 (1.09) 
3.16 
(1.09) 
3.25 
(1.04) 
3.44 
(0.93) 
2.76 
(1.16) 
3.30 
(1.04) 
3.30 
(0.95) 
3.29 
(1.11) 
3.11 
(1.11) 
3.16 
(1.11) 
3.09 
(1.09) 
3.45 
(0.99) 
2.48 
(1.03) 
2.94 
(0.98) 
Fairness 2.70 (1.15) 
2.56 
(1.06) 
2.82 
(1.05) 
2.88 
(1.11) 
2.28 
(1.16) 
2.29 
(1.08) 
2.57 
(0.96) 
2.40 
(1.13) 
2.37 
(1.08) 
2.34 
(1.09) 
2.45 
(1.07) 
2.68 
(1.04) 
2.16 
(0.98) 
2.46 
(0.99) 
Effectiveness 2.24 (1.25) 
2.31 
(1.20) 
1.97 
(1.01) 
2.43 
(1.02) 
2.63 
(1.23) 
2.35 
(1.12) 
2.10 
(1.05) 
2.57 
(1.20) 
2.50 
(1.33) 
2.15 
(1.09) 
2.36 
(1.14) 
2.26 
(1.2) 
1.84 
(1.05) 
2.17 
(0.98) 
Waste 3.84 (1.18) 
4.11 
(0.99) 
3.94 
(1.18) 
3.41 
(1.12) 
3.60 
(1.21) 
3.90 
(1.09) 
4.17 
(0.94) 
3.77 
(1.09) 
4.21 
(1.01) 
3.81 
(1.17) 
3.79 
(1.08) 
3.97 
(1.14) 
4.37 
(0.89) 
3.81 
(1.15) 
Abs_burden 4.80 (0.76) 
3.33 
(1.83) 
3.28 
(1.87) 
3.59 
(1.71) 
3.47 
(1.89) 
4.39 
(1.75) 
3.63 
(1.86) 
4.58 
(1.27) 
4.79 
(0.81) 
5.04 
(0.86) 
3.83 
(1.53) 
3.06 
(2.07) 
4.10 
(1.67) 
3.86 
(1.75) 
Rel_burden 3.48 (0.78) 
3.30 
(0.82) 
3.38 
(0.83) 
3.31 
(0.77) 
3.43 
(0.97) 
3.79 
(0.93) 
3.32 
(0.95) 
3.19 
(1.10) 
2.95 
(0.84) 
3.29 
(0.94) 
3.30 
(0.74) 
3.30 
(0.90) 
3.45 
(0.99) 
2.56 
(1.09) 
Country 2.45 (1.02) 
2.53 
(0.90) 
2.54 
(0.97) 
2.46 
(0.84) 
2.62 
(0.96) 
2.50 
(0.94) 
2.65 
(0.89) 
2.62 
(1.04) 
2.19 
(0.83) 
2.71 
(1.00) 
2.15 
(1.03) 
2.65 
(1.05) 
2.07 
(0.80) 
2.44 
(0.97) 
Society 4.36 (2.06) 
4.60 
(2.08) 
3.99 
(2.02) 
5.80 
(1.76) 
4.77 
(2.13) 
4.88 
(2.20) 
4.11 
(2.26) 
6.37 
(2.63) 
4.45 
(2.19) 
5.06 
(2.76) 
3.93 
(1.97) 
4.32 
(2.19) 
5.30 
(1.81) 
4.36 
(2.30) 
Corr_brib 3.96 (0.76) 
3.46 
(0.88) 
3.36 
(0.85) 
2.71 
(0.77) 
3.55 
(0.88) 
3.42 
(1.03) 
3.81 
(0.72) 
4.08 
(0.69) 
3.37 
(0.85) 
3.85 
(0.78) 
3.72 
(0.88) 
3.80 
(0.74) 
3.39 
(0.77) 
4.04 
(0.72) 
Brib_exp 0.06 (0.24) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.14 
(0.34) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
Compliance 4.46 (0.62) 
4.27 
(0.62) 
3.89 
(0.78) 
4.19 
(0.61) 
3.98 
(0.79) 
4.05 
(0.75) 
4.22 
(0.69) 
4.42 
(0.62) 
4.26 
(0.64) 
4.38 
(0.66) 
4.32 
(0.67) 
4.19 
(0.68) 
4.34 
(0.62) 
3.81 
(0.75) 
Trust 3.24 (2.20) 
3.82 
(2.01) 
5.47 
(2.09) 
5.53 
(1.79) 
5.13 
(2.25) 
5.18 
(2.17) 
4.56 
(2.01) 
3.03 
(2.43) 
3.90 
(1.96) 
4.47 
(2.10) 
4.35 
(2.27) 
4.44 
(2.18) 
3.58 
(2.01) 
3.11 
(1.90) 
Peers 6.57 (3.34) 
6.00 
(3.24) 
5.50 
(2.93) 
5.76 
(3.16) 
7.13 
(2.74) 
4.98 
(3.62) 
5.39 
(3.48) 
6.27 
(3.15) 
5.54 
(3.29) 
7.43 
(2.64) 
6.34 
(3.25) 
5.56 
(2.95) 
6.72 
(3.17) 
4.43 
(2.99) 
Self_emp 0.05 (0.22) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.26) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.10 
(0.31) 
0.0 
(0.22)5 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
Tax_services 8.17 (0.94) 
7.90 
(1.02) 
7.95 
(0.73) 
8.19 
(0.85) 
7.67 
(0.96) 
8.27 
(0.85) 
8.20 
(0.81) 
7.66 
(0.97) 
8.01 
(0.91) 
7.92 
(0.97) 
7.60 
(1.14) 
8.05 
(0.69) 
7.69 
(0.86) 
7.71 
(0.72) 
Male 39.51% 41.05% 50.93% 36.71% 44.73% 39.38% 40.60% 45.08% 41.56% 42.04% 43.67% 40.40% 41.51% 35.20% 
Age 54.18 (17.26) 
51.52 
(17.84) 
47.88 
(17.75) 
54.38 
(18.06) 
51.07 
(17.28) 
49.95 
(17.88) 
54.61 
(19.47) 
46.19 
(17.59) 
51.01 
(16.95) 
53.96 
(17.55) 
52.58 
(17.47) 
51.13 
(16.81) 
54.96 
(17.76) 
47.42 
(17.14) 
Edu 3.43 (1.75) 
3.21 
(1.62) 
3.47 
(1.40) 
4.13 
(1.86) 
2.52 
(1.44) 
4.12 
(1.67) 
3.90 
(1.88) 
3.46 
(1.67) 
3.49 
(2.06) 
3.04 
(1.55) 
3.00 
(1.50) 
3.63 
(2.20) 
3.20 
(1.53) 
4.81 
(1.81) 
Religion 3.22 (1.59) 
4.12 
(1.99) 
2.07 
(1.56) 
2.41 
(1.35) 
2.64 
(1.77) 
2.87 
(1.77) 
3.71 
(1.76) 
3.84 
(1.6) 
5.56 
(1.98) 
4.48 
(1.73) 
3.44 
(1.57) 
4.43 
(2.52) 
3.23 
(2.22) 
3.84 
(1.62) 
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BGR HRV CZE EST HUN LVA LTU MDA POL ROU SRB SVK SVN UKR 
Perceived 
_power 
3.81 
(0.84) 
3.86 
(0.72) 
3.39 
(0.88) 
3.94 
(0.73) 
3.55 
(0.80) 
3.67 
(0.84) 
3.69 
(0.8) 
3.80 
(0.75) 
3.90 
(0.75) 
3.96 
(0.81) 
3.48 
(0.88) 
3.70 
(0.80) 
2.89 
(0.83) 
3.41 
(0.73) 
Intrinsic 
_motivations 
4.05 
(0.70) 
4.02 
(0.67) 
3.59 
(0.81) 
4.12 
(0.64) 
3.58 
(0.80) 
3.75 
(0.84) 
3.94 
(0.63) 
3.87 
(0.71) 
4.04 
(0.62) 
4.14 
(0.65) 
4.17 
(0.65) 
3.79 
(0.64) 
3.62 
(0.58) 
3.79 
(0.66) 
Non_compliant_
behavior 
0.04 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.19) 
0.12 
(0.25) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.25) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
0.11 
(0.22) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.14) 
0.15 
(0.25) 
N 1,732 1,615 1,502 1,501 1,500 1,521 1,596 1,879 1,540 1,608 1,596 1,505 1,532 1,412 
Notes: N (total) =22,039 (representative sample). Subjects from Bulgaria (BGR), Croatia (HRV), Czech Republic (CZE), Estonia (EST), Hungary (HUN), Latvia (LVA), 
Lithuania (LTU), Moldova (MDA), Poland (POL), Romania (ROU), Serbia (SRB), Slovakia (SVK), Slovenia (SVN), and Ukraine (UKR). 
